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Abstract
Social epidemiologist Davey Smith (2011) argues that epidemiologists should accept a
gloomy prospect: considerable randomness at the individual level means that they
should keep their focus on modifiable causes of disease at the population level. The
difficulty epidemiology has had in moving from significant population-level risk factors to
improved prediction of cases at an individual level is analogous to the lack of success in
the search for systematic aspects of the non-shared environmental influences that
human quantitative genetics claims overshadow common environmental influences
(e.g., the family’s socioeconomic status which siblings have in common). This article
responds to the argument and analogy, aiming to draw three audiences—social
epidemiologists, human quantitative geneticists, and philosophers of science—into a
shared discussion that centers not on randomness, but on heterogeneity in various
forms. The first half undercuts the analogy, providing a critical account of human
quantitative genetics that explains why its estimates are unreliable and typical
interpretations, such as that of non-shared environmental influences, unjustified. In the
process, attention is drawn to the possibility of underlying heterogeneity—when similar
responses of different types in a species or of different groups of people are observed, it
need not be assumed that similar conjunctions of genetic and environmental factors (or,
in epidemiology, risk and protective factors) have been involved in producing those
responses. The second half introduces several additional forms of heterogeneity and
captures their potential significance for epidemiology in four conceptual themes. The
1

themes complicate Davey Smith’s advice for epidemiologists not to seek improved
prediction of cases at an individual level and his view of the limited prospects for
personalized medicine.
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1. Introduction
In the John Snow Lecture to the World Congress of Epidemiology, George Davey Smith
(2011) addressed the difficulty epidemiology has had moving from significant
population-level risk factors to improved prediction of cases at an individual level. The
gloomy prospect of his account is that epidemiology is concerned with the mean of the
group and has to discount random variation around that mean. Epidemiologists should,
he advises, accept considerable randomness at the individual level and keep their focus
on modifiable causes of disease at the population level.
In making his case, Davey Smith draws an analogy from human quantitative
genetics, a field that revolves around partitioning variation in a trait into a heritability
fraction and other components. The field claims that non-shared environmental
influences overshadow common environmental influences—the former corresponding to
differences among siblings raised together; the latter to influences such as
socioeconomic status that the siblings in a family usually have in common. Davey
Smith notes that the search for systematic aspects of the non-shared environmental
influences has been unsuccessful, which he sees in the same terms as the lack of
success by epidemiologists who seek individual-level risk prediction.
This article takes the use of this analogy by an epidemiologist as an opportunity
to address three audiences: social epidemiologists, human quantitative geneticists, and
philosophers of science—especially those who have examined debates about
heritability of human traits. My goal is to draw the different audiences into a shared
discussion that centers not on randomness, but on heterogeneity in various forms. The
first half (sections 2-5) undercuts the analogy by providing a critical account of human
quantitative genetics that explains why its estimates are unreliable and typical
interpretations, such as that of non-shared environmental influences, are unjustified. In
the process, attention is drawn to the possibility of underlying heterogeneity—when
similar responses of different types in a species or of different groups of people are
observed, it need not be assumed that similar conjunctions of genetic and
environmental factors have been involved in producing those responses. The second
half (sections 6-7) extends underlying heterogeneity to include risk and protective
factors in epidemiology, introduces several additional forms of heterogeneity, and
3

captures their potential significance for epidemiology in four conceptual themes. The
themes complicate Davey Smith’s advice for epidemiologists not to seek improved
prediction of cases at an individual level and his view of the limited prospects for
personalized medicine.

2. Genetic is not genetic is not genetic
The first step in developing a critical account of quantitative genetics is to identify three
conceptually and empirically distinct senses of “genetic,” pertaining to: statistical
partitioning of variation in measurements on a trait; relatedness in terms of the fraction
of variable part of genome shared; and the statistical association of a trait with
measurable genetic factors that underlie the development of that trait. (There are other
senses of genetic, such as “runs in the family,” but these will not be the focus here.)
Before elaborating on the significance of the different senses of genetic, two
terminological notes are in order:
1. “Factor” is used throughout the article in a non-technical sense to refer simply
to something whose presence or absence can be observed or whose level can be
measured. Measurable genetic factors include the presence or absence of alleles at a
specific locus on a chromosome, repeated DNA sequences, reversed sections of
chromosomes, and so on. Measurable environmental factors can range widely, say,
from mean daily intake of calories to degree of maltreatment that a person experienced
as a child.
2. An agricultural variety or breed is a group of individuals whose mix of genetic
factors can be replicated, as in an open pollinated plant variety, or any group of
individuals whose relatedness by genealogy can be characterized, such as offspring of
a given pair of parents. A location is the situation or place in which the variety is raised,
such as a specific experimental research station.
In regards to statistical partitioning of variation in measurements on a trait, Figure
1 depicts the ideal case, namely, an agricultural evaluation trial where each of a set of
varieties is raised in each of set of locations, and there are two or more replicates in
each variety-location combination. The means for each variety across all locations and
replicates can be estimated; the variance of these variety means is the so-called genetic
4

variance of classical quantitative genetics. The term genetic variance here is a
contraction of genotypic variance, where genotype is a synonym for an agricultural
variety and does not refer to pairs of alleles. Genotypic variance is shorthand, in turn,
for variance of the genotypic values, i.e., the variety means just described. The figure
makes clear that partitioning or analysis of variation for a given trait neither requires nor
produces knowledge about the genetic or environmental factors that underlie the
development of that trait in the different variety-location combinations.
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Figure 1. Partitioning of variation for a given trait in the ideal agricultural evaluation trial
where each of a set of varieties is raised in each of set of locations, and there are two or
more replicates in each variety-location combination. The bars next to the varieties and
locations indicate the average value of the trait for, respectively, each variety and
location. The variation between replicates within variety-location combinations is
indicated by the size of the curly brackets. The non-systematic shading of the brackets
indicates that the variation between replicates is not correlated from one variety-location
combination to another. (For graphic clarity, the average values for each varietylocation combination after allowing for the variety and location averages are not shown.)
Broad-sense heritability (hereon: heritability) is by definition is the ratio of the
variance among variety means (i.e., genotypic values) to the variance of the trait across
the whole data set. In the agricultural evaluation trial of Figure 1, this quantity can be
readily estimated. Similarly, for estimation of the fraction of variance due to differences
among location means, otherwise called the environmental variance (where
environment here is a synonym for location), and for the fraction due to variety-location
interaction, otherwise called genotype-environment interaction. (This last term,
confusingly, has no conceptual or empirical relationship to gene-environment
interaction, a concept introduced in section 6).
Relatedness in terms of the fraction of variable part of genome shared comes
into play when the data set is not as complete as in the ideal agricultural trial. In the
field of quantitative genetics the estimation of heritability and other fractions of the trait’s
overall variance typically makes use of the genealogical relatedness of the varieties or
genotypes. For example, as is common in studies of humans, the similarity of pairs of
monozygotic twins, which share all their genes, can be compared with the similarity of
pairs of dizygotic twins, which share most of their genes, but only around half of the
genes that vary in the population. An estimate of heritability can be derived using a
formula or a Structural Equation Model that takes into account the extent to which the
mean similarity of monozygotic twins raised in the same family exceeds the mean
similarity of dizygotic twins raised in the same family (Rijsdijk and Sham 2002) (Figure
2). (The estimation of the location or environmental fraction of the variation, its division
6

into shared and non-shared components, and other details are taken up in section 5.)

Figure 2. The basis for a comparison of the similarity of monozygotic twins raised
together in the same locations or families (MZT) with the similarity of dizygotic twin pairs
(DZT). The variation between twins in a pair is indicated by the size of the curly
brackets. In contrast to the agricultural evaluation trial in Figure 1, the replicates of any
twin pair are raised in only one household per twin pair.
Another terminological note is in order: From hereon, the agricultural terms
“variety” and “location” are used even when referring to human studies whenever the
entity or situation can be identified without reference, respectively, to measurable
genetic and environmental factors. For humans, a location is typically the family of
upbringing. The more common terms for variety and location, genotype and
environment, invite conflation with genetic and environmental factors and confusion
about what is and is not entailed (Keller 2010).
7

Classical quantitative genetics, like the statistical partitioning of variation from the
agricultural trials, makes reference neither to the measurable genetic factors that
underlie the development of that trait nor to the underlying environmental factors.
(Models of hypothetical genes are required to generate the traditional formulas of
quantitative genetics [Falconer and Mackay (1996), Lynch and Walsh (1998)], but this is
a conceptually distinct matter—one that is taken up in section 5.) In contrast, the
statistical association of a trait with measurable genetic factors that underlie the
development of that trait has received increasing attention in the era of genomics (even
though detecting such associations has been possible since the rediscovery of
Mendelian genetics at the turn of the last century). The implications of such
associations are discussed in sections 6-7.

3. Underlying heterogeneity
As described in the previous section, the estimation of heritability is associated with
analysis of variation in traits, not transmission of heritable factors. Moreover, the
analysis of variation for a given trait does not produce knowledge about the genetic or
environmental factors that that underlie the development of that trait. This last point is
widely recognized, yet it is commonplace for researchers and commentators to describe
estimates of heritability for a trait as the fraction of variation “due to genetic differences”
or “due to differences in genetic factors” (albeit factors yet to be identified). By
implication, the genetic and environmental variances are held to capture the relative
influence of, respectively, genetic and environmental factors.
The unwarranted construal of heritability in terms of genetic factors seems to
have two sources: conflation with the commonplace term heritable as meaning
transmitted through genes from parent to offspring; and use of the shorthand “genetic
variance” to refer to the variance among genotypic values or, in the terms of this article,
variance among variety means. More recently, the construal of heritability in terms of
genetic factors has been reinforced by use of the term missing heritability when a
conceptually distinct quantity—the fraction of variation for a trait associated with
genomic variants identified in GWA studies—is much lower than the heritability
estimated by classical quantitative genetics (Manolio et al. 2009).
8

Three observations about the agricultural trial and the quantitative genetics study
of relatives help counteract the common muddying of the distinction between heritability
as derived from analysis of variation in traits and the transmission of heritable factors.
The third observation—about underlying heterogeneity—is the most important for the
subsequent sections of the article.
1. The variety means (or genotypic values) are means over the trait as it has
developed in a specific range of variety-location (genotype-environment) combinations.
The variance of those means thus reflects differences in the ways those variety-location
combinations—and not simply the varieties in themselves—influence the trait
development.
2. The partitioning of variation could, in principle, be undertaken even if the trait
measurements were of varieties from different species, classes, or even kingdoms. This
thought experiment implies that the variation among the variety means need not
correspond to some gradient in genetic factors. Nothing in the method of partitioning
variation, even within a species, requires that such a gradient exists. This observation
also applies to the variation among location means or environmental variance.
3. Even if the similarity among twins or a set of close relatives is associated with
similarity of yet-to-be-identified genetic factors, the factors may not be the same from
one set of relatives to the next, or from one location (environment) to the next. In other
words, the underlying factors may be heterogeneous. It could be that pairs of alleles,
say, AAbbcbDDee, subject to a sequence of environmental factors, say, FghiJ, are
associated, all other things being equal, with the same outcome as alleles
aabbCCDDEE subject to a different sequence of environmental factors FgHiJ (Figure
3).
The possibility of heterogeneity of underlying genetic and environmental factors
has not been widely acknowledged by quantitative geneticists. Heterogeneity in the
genetic factors underlying traits might explain the limited success GWA studies have
had identifying causally relevant genetic variants behind variation in human traits with
moderate to high heritability values. The possibility of underlying heterogeneity is
consistent with, but more nuanced than, the standard view that most medically
significant traits are associated with many genes, each of quite small effect (McCarthy
9

Figure 3. Factors underlying a trait may be heterogeneous even when monozygotic
twins raised together (MZT) are more similar than dizygotic twins raised together (DZT).
The greater similarity is indicated by the smaller size of the curly brackets. The
underlying factors for two MZT pairs are indicated by upper and lower case letters for
pairs of alleles (A-E) and environmental factors to which they are subject (F-J).
et al. 2008, Couzin-Frankel 2010). Moreover, considering heterogeneity of underlying
factors is a matter of attention to environmental as well as genetic factors.

4. What is to be done?
What can researchers do on the basis of knowing that a trait’s heritability or another
fraction of variance is high when the factors underlying that trait might be
heterogeneous? As will become evident, the range of options for human studies
becomes very limited. Perspective on this can be gained by examining what is and is
10

not possible in an agricultural trial, in which control over varieties and locations is far
greater than with human variation. This example, in turn, provides food for thought if we
move beyond Davey Smith’s advice that epidemiology is concerned with the mean of
the group and has to discount random variation around that mean (see section 7).
Typically, in an agricultural trial there is variety by location interaction (i.e.,
genotype by environment interaction) in the analysis of trait variation, which means that
for the trait in question the ranking of varieties varies across locations; the best variety
in one location is not the best in other locations. The possibility of heterogeneity
underlying the variation in trait means can, however, be reduced by grouping varieties
that are similar in responses across locations using techniques of cluster analysis (Byth
et al. 1976), or in other words, by grouping according to similarity in variety means
together with variety by location interaction means. (Similarly, locations can be grouped
by similarity in responses elicited from varieties grown across those locations.)
Varieties in any resulting group tend to be above average for a location in the same
locations and below average in the same location (Figure 4).
Now, the wider the range of locations in the measurements on which the
grouping is based, the more likely it is that the ups and downs shared by varieties in a
group are produced by the same conjunctions of underlying measurable factors. This
gives researchers more license to discount the possibility of underlying heterogeneity
within a group. They can then hypothesize about the group means—about what factors
in the locations elicited basically the same response from varieties in a particular variety
group that distinguishes them from other groups. Of course, knowledge from sources
other than the data analysis is always needed to help researchers generate any
hypotheses about genetic and environmental factors.
For example, imagine a group of plant varieties that originated from particular
parental stock more susceptible to plant rusts, a form of parasitic fungi, and that these
varieties yielded poorly in locations where rainfall occurred in concentrated periods on
poorly drained soils. The obvious hypothesis about genetic factors modulated by
environmental factors is that these varieties share genes from the parental stock that
are related to rust susceptibility and this susceptibility is evident in the measurements of
yield in locations where the rainfall pattern enhances rusts. Through additional research
11

Figure 4. Yields for 5 groups of wheat varieties grown in 13 groups of locations (from
Byth et al. 1976; reproduced with permission). The x-axis is the mean over all varieties
for that location. The individual varieties (not shown) were clustered into these 5 groups
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by similarity of response across locations. These groups were then clustered into two
groups as shown in the two plots.
comparing the variety and parental genomes, it may be possible to identify specific sets
of genes that are shared, to investigate whether and how each one contributes to rust
susceptibility in certain environmental conditions, and to use that knowledge in
subsequent research or in planting recommendations (Taylor 2006). (Of course, plant
breeders can make informed decisions about what varieties to cross even in the
absence of knowledge about the specific genetic factors and environmental conditions
involved.)
What role does heritability play in research that groups varieties, thus reducing
underlying heterogeneity and facilitating the generation of hypotheses about underlying
genetic and environmental factors? Answer: Very little. Clustering ensures that the
variation among the means for groups of varieties is much higher than the average
variation among variety means within groups. The low within-group variation allows the
selective breeder to select from the variety group without being very concerned about
whether any one variety is the best within that group across all the locations. In other
words, heritability within the variety group is not so important. At the same time, even if
variation among variety group means is smaller than variation among location means or
variation among variety by location interaction means (that is, between-group heritability
is small), researchers can still hypothesize about the group means. In short, the size of
the fractions of variance is not key to hypothesizing about the underlying genetic and
environmental factors.
Grouping varieties by similarity of responses across locations becomes more
difficult when varieties are observed in only a few locations or when the locations are
not the same from one variety to the next. This is the case, of course, for variation
among traits in humans. It should be noted, however, that reduction of underlying
heterogeneity, although helpful, is not essential to agricultural and laboratory breeding.
Breeders know, by the very definition of heritability, that a high value means that
differences among the mean values for the varieties make up much of the total variation
for the trait in question. So the breeders can mate or cross individuals with the desired
13

values for the trait, expecting that this will lead to offspring with similar, desired values,
and thus to improvement in the overall average compared with the previous generation.
Now, if there is underlying heterogeneity, the reassortment of genes from parents may
well lead to some far-from-expectation offspring, even when the offspring are raised in
the locations of their parents (in the example given in Figure 3, AabbCcDDEe subject to
the factors FghiJ or FgHiJ). Yet, such outcomes are not troubling to breeders because
they can compensate when the results do not meet their expectations. They discard the
far-from-expectation offspring and select only those offspring that do have the desired
values.
In the study of human traits, selective mating and discarding of defectives is
obviously not acceptable. Nor is it possible to replicate human genetic material together
with the environmental conditions of many defined locations. It is impossible to have
the level of control needed to obtain data for grouping varieties that are similar in
responses across locations. In short, as noted earlier, human studies involve
substantially less control over materials and conditions than agricultural and laboratory
trials. Researchers should expect, therefore, to gain correspondingly less insight about
genetic and environmental factors from partitioning of variation for a human trait into the
various fractions.
Returning then to the question with which this section began: What then can
researchers do once they acknowledge that similarity among human twins or a set of
close relatives may well be associated with similarity of yet-to-be-identified genetic
factors but the factors may not be the same from one set of relatives to the next, or from
one location to the next? Researchers have three options for proceeding on the basis
of knowing that a trait’s heritability is high when the factors underlying that trait might be
heterogeneous:
1. Undertake research to identify the specific, measurable genetic and
environmental factors without reference to the trait’s heritability or the other fractions of
the total variance. (e.g., Moffitt et al. 2005, Davey Smith and Ebrahim 2007, Khoury et
al. 2007).
2. Restrict attention to variation within a set of relatives. For example, even if the
underlying factors are unknown, high heritability still means that if one twin develops the
14

trait, e.g., type 1 diabetes, the other twin is more likely to as well. This information might
stimulate the second twin to take measures to reduce the health impact if and when the
disease starts to appear. However, notice that this scenario assumes that the timing of
getting the condition differs from the first twin to the second. Researchers might well
then ask: What factors influence the timing? How changeable are these? How much
reduction in risk comes from changing them? To address these issues they would have
to identify the genetic and environmental factors involved in the development of the trait,
but to do so requires larger sample sizes than any single set of relatives allows. In any
case, the question would then arise as to whether the initial results would carry over
from one set of relatives to others. Resolving this question is an empirical matter, but it
is obvious that carry over becomes less likely the more heterogeneity there is in the
factors underlying the development of the trait. Researchers have to be prepared,
therefore, for the possibility that the proportion of fruitful investigations will be low
compared to those confounded by factors not carrying over well from the initial set of
relatives.
3. Use high heritability as an indicator that “the trait [is] a potentially worthwhile
candidate for molecular research” to identify the specific genetic factors involved
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002, chap. 11) and hope that for some traits a gradient
of a measurable genetic factor (or composite of factors) runs through the differences
among variety means. Such traits might be worth finding even if, in the course of doing
so, researchers end up conducting many fruitless investigations of other high-heritability
traits for which it turns out there is no such gradient.
Equivalent options apply to proceeding on the basis of knowing another fraction
of a trait’s variance is high but the factors underlying that trait might be heterogeneous.
In particular, when a high value for the among-location-means (or “shared
environmental”) fraction of variance is used to decide when to search for the specific
environmental factors involved, the hope is that for some traits a gradient of a
measurable environmental factor (or composite of factors) runs through the differences
among location means. Again, this option involves the possibility of fruitless
investigations of traits for which there is no gradient in underlying factors. Similarly, if
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the researcher chooses to look for specific measurable factors underlying high fractions
of non-shared environmental variance and variety-location interaction variance.
The possibility of fruitless investigations of traits for which there is no gradient in
underlying factors is not the only concern researchers should have about being guided
by high estimates of heritability or other fractions of variance in the traits. As the next
section explains, there are more serious problems about estimates and interpretation of
fractions of variance for human traits. (Appendix A is provided to counter the response
that, given decades of debate among methodologically sophisticated scholars, it is
implausible that some fundamental problems in quantitative genetic estimation could
have been overlooked [Kendler 2005]. The appendix describes some of the
background that has allowed the author to see the study of heredity and variation
differently from most researchers and philosophers of science who have contributed to
debates about classical quantitative genetics.)

5. Unreliable estimates of fractions of variance for human traits
The reliability of the established methods of estimation of fractions of variance for
human traits can be checked by considering a hypothetical agricultural trial where every
variety is raised in every location and replicated twice and where the replicates for each
variety-location combination are either monozygotic or dizygotic twins (Taylor 2012).
The analysis of variance allows one to estimate the trait’s actual heritability in that trial,
that is, the fraction of the trait’s variance associated with differences among the means
for the varieties, where these means are taken over all locations and replicates.
Similarly, the actual fractions can be estimated for the among-location-means variance,
the among-variety-location-interaction-means fraction, and the residual or “error”
variance, that is, the average variance within variety-location-combinations. At the
same time, given that the replicates are twins, one can also estimate the fractions of
variance using the standard formulas of human quantitative genetics (Rijsdijk and Sham
2002). If the standard formulas do not yield estimates that match the correct values
from the analysis of variance, something must be wrong with those formulas.
That the standard formulas of human quantitative genetics do not, indeed, match
the correct values can be demonstrated theoretically and through analysis of simulated
16

agricultural trials (Taylor 2007, 2012). To appreciate why the standard formulas, as well
as their generalization as Structural Equation Models, do not yield reliable values, it is
helpful to note the following features of those formulas:
1. The standard formulas and Structural Equation Models do not separate a
variety-location-interaction variance fraction, but subsume it in the among-varietymeans variance fraction, that is, in the so-called heritability estimate.
2. Empirical estimation of the variety-location-interaction variance fraction is
nevertheless possible, but only if the appropriate classes of data are available; that is
not often the case. For example, it is not common to have data about monozygotic
twins raised in separate locations in which there is no correlation from one twin’s
location to the other.
3. Partitioning of trait variation into components rests on models of hypothetical,
idealized genes with simple Mendelian inheritance and direct contributions to the trait.
Given that the data are about traits, an analysis of trait variation that makes no
reference to theoretical, idealized genes must also be possible (Taylor 2012). Such a
gene-free analysis affirms the distinction made in section 2, that estimation of heritability
is associated with analysis of variation in traits, not transmission of heritable factors.
4. The derivation of the standard formulas and models assumes that, all other
things being equal, similarity in traits for relatives is proportional to the fraction shared
by the relatives of all the genes that vary in the population. For example, fraternal or
dizygotic twins share half of the variable genes that identical or monozygotic twins
share. However, plausible models of the contributions of multiple genes to a trait can
be shown to result in, all other things being equal, ratios of dizygotic similarity to
monozygotic similarity that are not .5 and that vary considerably around their average
(Taylor 2007). This point here does not depend on the validity of any particular
hypothetical model of multiple genes contributing to the trait. The assumption is
unreliable because the relevant correlations need to be based on observed traits and,
as such, cannot be directly given by the proportion of shared genes involved in the
development of those traits. For the same reason, heuristic values of the similarity of
relatives of other degrees, which are ubiquitous, are also unreliable. (Identifying the
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exact fraction of genes shared by relatives [Visscher et al. 2006] does not address the
problem that similarity in traits for relatives need not be proportional to this fraction.)
5. Empirical estimation of a parameter to take degree of relatedness into
account depends on the appropriate classes of data being available. Data about
unrelated individuals raised in the same location are especially valuable.
6. The residual variance, or the sub-fraction of that variance not related to
measurement error, has been interpreted as a “non-shared environmental effect," where
a large value means that within-family or "non-shared environmental differences" are
large relative to the effects due to the members of a family growing up in the same
location or "shared environmental differences" (Plomin 1999; see critical review by
Turkheimer and Waldron 2000). The more careful interpretation is that residual
variance corresponds to the variation of trait differences among replicates within varietylocation combinations that has no systematic relation to variation among variety means,
among location means, or among variety-location combinations. Now, to interpret the
unsystematic variation of a trait in terms of differences in the underlying factors is not
warranted in the first place (see first paragraph of section 4). However, if one were to
go ahead and attempt to do just that, the interaction of genetic as well as environmental
factors in specific variety-location combinations would need to be included in the
picture.
When Davey Smith, the epidemiologist, invokes human behavioral genetics, he
cites the work of Turkheimer, a researcher on the more critical wing of his field.
Turkheimer (2004) emphasizes, as this article does, that a heterogeneity of pathways
can lead to the traits measured. The implications for human sciences that he and
Davey Smith attach to heterogeneous pathways are, however, colored by an
insufficiently critical interpretation of human quantitative genetic estimates. In particular,
following point 6 above, those estimates can provide no warrant for the claim they make
that the non-shared environmental influences overshadow common environmental
influences. Moreover, a corollary of the discussion so far is that none of Turkheimer’s
(2000) three laws of behavioral genetics is reliable; nor is an oft-cited addition (labeled 4
in Table 1).
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Table 1. Laws of behavioral genetics, recast
Laws of behavioral genetics

Revised statement

1. All human behavioral traits are

1. All human behavioral traits show heritability, but:

heritable.

a. estimation methods are not reliable; and b.
heritability does not mean that the “genetic”
(among-variety-means) variance translates into
differences in genetic factors across the population
studied.

2. The effect of being raised in

2. This effect has not been established, because a.

the same family is smaller than

estimation methods are not reliable; and b. fractions

the effect of the genes.

of variance do not translate into differences in
genetic and environmental factors across the
population studied.

3. A substantial portion of the

3. The residual fraction of the variation in complex

variation in complex human

human behavioral traits is often substantial, but the

behavioral traits is not accounted

interaction of unknown genetic as well as

for by the effects of genes or

environmental factors specific to the particular

families.

variety-location combinations underlies this
unsystematic variation.

4. Heritability tends to increase

4. Unless the estimation method separates the

over people's lifetimes, that is,

interaction fraction from heritability and it is shown

genetic differences come to

to be negligible, this trend could equally well

eclipse environmental differences

indicate that the interaction component increases

(Plomin 1999).

over time.

The critical account provided above and in previous sections calls into question
the interpretation from human quantitative genetics that “non-shared environmental”
influences among siblings overshadow shared environmental influences. (Appendix B
can be referred to for responses to the critical account and counter-responses.) Yet, if
the analogy that Davey Smith draws to the lack of success in the search for systematic
aspects of those “non-shared environmental influences” has been undercut, we are still
19

left with the difficulty epidemiology has had in moving from significant population-level
risk factors to improved prediction of cases at an individual level. To address that issue,
the next section extends the possibility of underlying heterogeneity raised in sections 3
and 4, and reviews several additional forms of heterogeneity. The final section captures
in four conceptual themes the potential significance for epidemiology of various forms of
heterogeneity.

6. Heterogeneity of heterogeneities
It is quite simple to extend the possibility of underlying heterogeneity to epidemiology:
when similar responses of different groups of people are observed, it need not be
assumed that similar conjunctions of risk and protective factors have been involved in
producing those responses. One difference, however, is that, whereas in quantitative
genetics the different varieties or locations are not distinguished by some measurable
genetic or environmental factors, in epidemiology the different groups of people are
typically characterized by reference to measurable factors, such as socio-economic
status, gender, or even genetic factors. The following example, in which researchers
detected associations of a trait with a combination of measurable genetic and
environmental factors, serves to illustrate this distinction and, at the same time, point to
various other forms of heterogeneity. (The example is also used to illustrate conceptual
points in section 7, but no endorsement of the importance or generality of the results
should be read into this choice; see Wasserman 2004 and Morris et al. 2007 for critical
commentaries.)
Figure 5 depicts a reported association of behavior with enzymatic activity related
to a single-locus genetic variant, MAOA, and with the social or environmental factor,
childhood maltreatment (Caspi et al. 2002). The association of MAOA and childhood
maltreatment with anti-social behavior is an instance of gene-environment interaction, a
term that refers to the statistical interaction between measured genetic factors and
measured environmental factors (Moffitt 2005). In other words, the association of the
trait with the genetic factor is modified by the value of the environmental factor, and vice
versa. (Such interaction, confusingly, has no conceptual or empirical relationship to
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“genotype-environment interaction” or variety-location interaction, as discussed in
sections 2-6.) The example involves a single genetic variant, but Genome-Wide
Association (GWA) studies are now able to quantify the mean effect of each of a wide
array of variants across the human genome on a trait, such as mean height differential
(Weedon et al. 2008), and relative risk for type 1 diabetes (Barrett et al. 2009).

Figure 5. Mean adult composite anti-social behavior score in relation to levels of
MonoAmineOxidaseA and Level of Childhood Maltreatment for a sample from Dunedin,
New Zealand (Caspi et al. 2002, 852; reproduced with permission).
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Epidemiologists should be familiar with heterogeneity of various forms that
complicate the statistical association of a trait with measurable factors. Consider the
MAOA-maltreatment example:
1. The points plotted in Figure 5 represent a mean value, around which there is
variation (which is the simplest form of heterogeneity) in the measure of antisocial
behavior.
2. The binary of high-versus-low MAOA activity is a simplification of the many
variants in the MAOA gene and related regulatory regions (Di Giovanni et al. 2008,
84ff).
3. Similarly, childhood maltreatment varies in nature, degree, and timing, as well
as in its meaning to the child.
4. The trait in question, anti-social behavior, can be assessed in different ways
(indeed, Figure 3 plots a composite index derived from various assessments).
5. Even for any one assessment of anti-social behavior, different individuals may
have arrived at similar values through different pathways of development (in the same
way that is clearly the case for development of human height).
Equivalent considerations pertain to the effects associated with multiple genetic variants
exposed through GWA studies (although the number of GWA studies of interactions
between genetic and environmental factors is still small). In short, there is a
heterogeneity of heterogeneities.

7. What is to be done?—Part II
Should epidemiologists follow Davey Smith’s advice to accept considerable
randomness at the individual level and keep their focus on modifiable causes of disease
at the population level? Or are there other courses of action? In particular, when
researchers find a statistical association of a trait with measurable risk or protective
factors, what can they do given the potential for various forms of heterogeneity to
complicate the association? These questions are viewed in relation to four conceptual
themes in the sub-sections to follow. The cases used are presented with a view to
motivating the conceptual themes, not to surveying the literature on any of the cases.
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7.1 The push for individualized or personalized medicine can lead to more populationlevel treatment or treatment according to the mean of one’s group.
Consider population-level approaches in the MAOA-maltreatment case. As the
authors conclude, their results "could inform the development of future pharmacological
treatments" (Caspi et al. 2002, 853). By implication, if low-MAOA children could be
identified, prophylatic drug treatment could reduce their propensity to anti-social
behavior as adults, or, more strictly, their vulnerability to childhood maltreatment insofar
as that increases their propensity to anti-social behavior as adults. Reciprocally, if
severe childhood maltreatment could be identified and reduced or stopped early, this
action could nullify the influence of a child’s MAOA level on undesired adult outcomes.
The risk reduction for anti-social behavior produced by each population-level approach
would depend on whether the threshold for unacceptable anti-social behavior is set high
or low.
Of course, with only 3% of the population in the low-MAOA plus severemaltreatment category, epidemiologists might not recommend any population-level
action based on the reported association. Moreover, they may wait to see if the results
in this case apply to populations other than that of the original study (Wasserman 2004,
Morris et al. 2007). Indeed, some meta-analyses have cast doubt on the generality of a
similar study by Caspi, Moffitt and collaborators (Risch et al. 2009). Suppose,
however, for discussion purposes, that something analogous to the MAOAmaltreatment result is replicated and the proportion in the high-risk category is sufficient
to stimulate action. The population-level approaches could still run into troubles, in the
following manner.
Notice that Figure 3 presents the means; around any mean there will be
variation. From other figures in the study (Caspi et al. 2002) it can be seen that some of
the high-MAOA individuals end up with higher anti-social behavior scores than some of
the low-MAOA individuals. Moreover, depending on the threshold, a substantial fraction
of the low-MAOA plus severe-maltreatment category does not end up as anti-social
adults. Yet, in practice, once the resources were invested to screen children for MAOA
levels, the attention of parents, teachers, social workers, and so on would be focused
on all low-MAOA children. Indeed, how could treatment on the basis of group
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membership be avoided if such adults do not know from a childhood MAOA assessment
whether any particular individual is one who would go on, after childhood maltreatment,
to become an antisocial adult? (Of course, adults would take other traits into account in
how they treated any child, but what is relevant here is how information about MAOA
status influences treatment.)
Now, some of the parents of low-MAOA children might resist their children being
treated according to the mean of the MAOA group. They might also balk at years of
prophylatic drug treatment or of maltreatment monitoring by social workers. These
parents—together with others concerned about the same issues—could push for
additional research to identify other characteristics that differentiate among the lowMAOA children (and perhaps also help predict who among the high-MAOA children are
vulnerable). It may be that no systematic characteristics would be found; variation
within the low- and high-MAOA subpopulations would then fit Davey Smith’s view of
unavoidable randomness. Nevertheless, it would have been understandable that
researchers had sought a more refined account of risk factors than given by the
population-level approaches.
To understand the need for more refined risk accounts is not, however, to
endorse the pursuit of personalized medicine customized to the individual. Indeed, the
scenario played out above points to a serious shortcoming of that very endeavor. In its
simplest form, personalized medicine involves the use of genetic information to predict
which patients with a given condition (e.g., heart aryhthmia) will benefit from a particular
drug treatment (e.g., beta blockers). More ambitiously, personalized medicine promises
to inform people of their heightened vulnerability or resistance to specific environmental,
dietary, therapeutic, and other factors early enough so they can adjust their exposure
and risky behaviors accordingly.
If the MAOA analogy holds, the path to personalized medicine would often
involve a phase in which large numbers of people are treated according to their group
membership. Consider, however, which kinds of medical conditions would receive the
necessary investment in pharmaceutical and sociological research, screening, and
preventative treatment or monitoring to address the conjunction of genetic and
environmental factors involved. Some well-organized parental advocacy groups may
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secure funding to address the prenatal or neonatal diagnosis and post-natal treatment
of rare debilitating genetic disorders (Panofsky 2011, Terry et al. 2007), as happens
with phenylketonuria. However, public and corporate policy would more likely focus on
conditions with a large value for the average benefit of ameliorating the effect of the
genetic difference multiplied by number of people considered vulnerable.
For high-average-benefit conditions, taking the MAOA case as a guide, if the
effect of the genetic difference depends on identified social or environmental factors,
and if variability within the groups that have on-average high and low vulnerability
produces a problem of misclassification, then pressure would arise for researchers to
differentiate among individuals within the groups. However, until distinguishing
characteristics were found, parents, teachers, doctors, social workers, insurance
companies, policy makers, friends, and the individuals themselves could make no better
use of the genetic information than to treat individuals according to which genetic group
they belonged to. (Again, some people listed in the previous sentence would take other
traits into account in how they treated any individual, but what is relevant here is how
the genetic information influences that treatment.) Moreover, if the additional research
were not conducted or were not successful, or if the cost of differentiating among
individuals were too high, we might never get beyond treating individuals according to
their genetic-group membership. In short, an under-acknowledged danger in the pursuit
of personalized medicine lies, ironically, in genetic information being used to treat
people according to the mean of their genetic group—a population-level approach—
leaving variation around that mean accepted as unavoidable noise.
7.2 It can be quite reasonable to try to differentiate among individuals so as to improve
risk prediction, even though finding ways to do so may not be straightforward.
Consider the modifiability in practice of any given population-level risk factor and
take the MAOA-maltreatment scenario as a thought experiment. Population-level
measures would require more than finding a safe and effective prophylatic drug
treatment. MAOA screening would need to become routine, compliance with the
treatment achieved, and so-called side-effects addressed—including the effects of
considering all low-MAOA children as incipiently anti-social. On the maltreatment side,
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the detection and prevention of childhood maltreatment might entail intrusions into many
households, surveillance or mandatory reporting, monitoring and intervention by state
agencies, diversion of government budgets from other needs, and so on. In short, even
if reduced childhood maltreatment were seen as a positive outcome, the means might
not be unconditionally positive to all (Wasserman 2004).
What the example illustrates is that, for the population-level approach to make
sense, the population-level risk factor has to be modifiable in practice. This depends on
the political, economic, and cultural circumstances around public health measures, as is
well illustrated by the uneven implementation of laws in the United States requiring seat
belt use in cars (Wikipedia 2011). Moreover, the effects of shifting the distribution of
that factor should not disadvantageous to individuals who are not high risk. Unless both
of these conditions hold, it makes sense to search for risk factors that differentiate
individuals within a population. For some traits such a search might reveal no
systematic characteristics; variation within the populations would then fit Davey Smith’s
view of unavoidable randomness. However, for other traits the within-population risk
factors might be identifiable; some of these factors might be easier to modify than the
population-level factors.
The population-level approach, advocated most famously by Rose (1985), is well
illustrated by the case of smoking and lung cancer. The relative and absolute risks of
smoking are high; there is a dose-response curve (Bjartveit and Tverdal 2005); and the
historical trends after allowing for latency match smoking rates. Moreover, populationlevel policies, such as cigarette taxes and indoor smoking bans, are not
disadvantageous for the health of those smokers who turn out to be less susceptible to
lung cancer. Nor are the policies disadvantageous to others outside the population in
question, i.e., non-smokers. In short, there seems to be little incentive now that
smoking-reduction policies are gained traction, to find ways to screen for high-risk
individuals and focus resources on treating them.
Most cases are, however, not like smoking and lung cancer; the justification for
de-emphasizing within-population risk factors is usually far less clear. Consider
cardiovascular disease. Lynch and colleagues reported that for a population of Finnish
men, “94.6% of [coronary heart disease] events occurred among men exposed to at
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least one conventional risk factor” (smoking, hypertension, dyslipidaemia, and
diabetes). They concluded that the focus of efforts to reduce coronary heart disease
should be on reducing these factors, not on further refinement of psychosocial or other
risk factors (Lynch et al. 2006). Yet, focusing on the conventional risk factors could
translate variously to population-level efforts for smoking reduction, to screening for and
treatment of individuals at high risk for hypertension, dyslipidaemia, and diabetes, or to
some hybrid effort in which anti-smoking efforts highlighted the special risk, say, to
people with high blood pressure. In short, it would be very reasonable for anyone
promoting or subject to the screening and treatment approach to be interested in
improved prediction of who is at high risk.
In this vein, Ridker et al. (2007) noted that the conventional risk factors for heart
disease in women (as combined in the Framingham score) misclassify many women as
of intermediate risk who were actually higher or lower risk. Ridker et al’s refined
Reynolds Risk Score performs better primarily, it seems, by including the risk marker
cReactive Protein (CRP). Health policymakers might examine the ratio of benefits from
improved risk determination to the increased cost from measuring CRP levels.
Biomedical researchers might see inclusion of CRP in the Reynolds Risk Score as
grounds for examining mechanisms around a rise in CRP levels for an individual. They
might hope for eventual improvement in therapy and prevention—perhaps targeted at
high-risk individuals, but perhaps also yielding population-level interventions.
It turns out that CRP is almost surely a marker, not a direct cause or valid
candidate for therapeutic reduction (C Reactive Protein Coronary Heart Disease
Genetics Collaboration 2011). Yet the point remains: Focusing on modifiable causes of
disease at the population level is a choice for epidemiologists that is not dictated solely
or primarily by considerable randomness at the individual level. There are situations in
which it is quite reasonable to be interested in improved prediction of cases at an
individual level. The value of any such improvements, however, depends on the
economics of health policy as well as on whether a richer picture of risk factors
translates through biomedical research into improvements in therapy and possibly
prevention.
Suppose researchers decide neither to discount nor to give blanket acceptance
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to randomness at the individual level. What they then face is not unbridled exploration
of risk factors that might differentiate individuals or sub-groups within the population.
Rather, it is the challenge of exposing possible risk factors and assessing which ones
are worth considering for insertion into refined risk equations for screening and
treatment. And for this challenge there are no off-the-shelf guidelines. Consider the
following contrasting cases. The pathway seems straightforward in the “changing view
of pathophysiology” underlying atherothrombosis, which led Ridker et al. (2007) to
assay a large number of biomarkers then compare a range of new risk prediction
equations that included CRP and other markers. The role of refined within-population
distinctions has, however, been more subtle in the research and discussions of Lustig
and his colleagues around the association of sugar (i.e., fructose-glucose) with
metabolic syndrome of diabetes, hypertension, lipid problems, and cardiovascular
disease (Lustig et al. 2012). They end up advocating a population-level policy of
reducing availability of sugar, but the path to that position is more complex. Arguments
over epidemiological associations—after all, countries with high sugar consumption also
have high fat consumption—are combined with physiological research to unravel
mechanisms of metabolism under various conditions. The latter research takes note,
among other things, that “20% of obese people have normal metabolism and… up to
40% of normal-weight people develop the diseases that constitute the metabolic
syndrome” (Lustig et al. 2012). This observation led to epidemiological comparisons
among countries that controlled for physical activity and being overweight or obese,
which have shown that “[d]ifferences in sugar availability statistically explain variations
in diabetes prevalence rates at a population level” (Basu et al. 2013).
Now, even if it turned out that approaches other than limiting sugar consumption
for the population were more feasible or effective in reducing coronary heart disease,
juxtaposing the Ridker and Lustig examples suffices to make the point that no simple
guidelines can be expected for research and policy for risk factors that differentiate
among individuals. That, however, is no argument against trying to differentiate among
individuals so as to improve risk prediction.
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7.3 When researchers think about the causal dynamics underlying patterns in data,
such as associations with risk factors, it may be helpful not to see deviations from
patterns as noise and to pay attention to heterogeneity in forms such as there being
multiple paths to the “same” trait.
The observation that CRP improves risk prediction even though it is not a causal
factor points to a further challenge. The conventional way to think about risk factors is
to distinguish the modifiable (e.g., blood pressure) from the non-modifiable (e.g.,
gender). We envisage modifying the former so as to change the risk; for the latter
clinicians screen more vigilantly or researchers investigate further with a view to
exposing what modifiable risk factors underlie them. There is, however, an alternative
way of thinking about both kinds of risk factors, namely to see them as patterns
detected in data generated by some unknown causal dynamics. Then, when
researchers envisage modifying a risk factor, they are hoping that the causal dynamics
generating past data persist into the current situation and that modification of a factor
does not restructure those dynamics—or, at least, not very much.
To modify factors without restructuring dynamics would mean, for example, that,
if low income is a risk factor for a condition (e.g., stress as measured by some
biomarker), an experiment in which some families get a lump sum increase in income
would be expected to lead to a lower rate of that condition. If this expectation seems
crude, it is because we are not surprised by results that indicate greater complexity in
the causal dynamics that generated the patterns as well as in the modified dynamics
emerging under the experiment. Ludwig et al. (2012), for example, showed that for
families joining an experiment in which some were randomly chosen to move “from a
high-poverty to lower-poverty neighborhood,” moving “leads to long-term (10- to 15year) improvements in adult physical and mental health and subjective well-being,
despite not affecting economic self-sufficiency.” The challenge that such examples
pose for epidemiologists is to expose the causal dynamics generating patterns in data,
moreover to do so in ways that provide expectations for how the dynamics might be
modified by interventions. Such interventions might be at a population level or they
might be only among high-risk individuals.
Exposing underlying causal dynamics may strike data analysts as an elusive
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goal, but it is instructive to at least entertain the quest. First, to avoid setting off in the
wrong direction, researchers might find avoid using the term “risk factor” because its
causal connotations invite confusion—perhaps “risk-associated variable” instead? They
should also put aside the contrast between modifiable causes of conditions at the
population level and randomness at the individual level. That framing leads us to see
deviation from a risk equation as noise whereas it could indicate the gap between the
fitted equation and the causal dynamics generating the data. Then researchers might
pick up the possibility of heterogeneity in genetic and environmental factors underlying
heritability and other fractions of the variation for a trait. Attention to this possibility can
be readily extended so that, when similar responses of different individual types are
observed, researchers do not assume that similar conjunctions of risk or protective
factors have been involved in producing those responses. There may be multiple
pathways to the same trait value. In this vein, the data analyses of Kendler et al. (2002)
and Ou (2005) in psychology and education are notable for exposing alternative
pathways—as well as admirable for their reserve about how to interpret their fitted
models causally.
Attention to heterogeneity may lead us to reconceive the trait being analyzed as
a heterogeneous mix of traits. Tilley (2000) provides a striking exemplar of this in his
discussion of evaluations of the effect of Closed Circuit television (CCTV) on crime in
parking lots. Such evaluations could mix together studies of situations in which different
mechanisms (or a mix of mechanisms) and different contexts apply. The different
CCTV-crime studies might be subject to a meta-analysis, but no meaningful
recommendation would be likely, even if all results were in the same direction (see also
Cartwright and Hardie 2012). Even though not all phenomena are like CCTV and crime,
key variables in epidemiology, such as socioeconomic status, admit to substantial
heterogeneity. As Davey-Smith et al. (2000) note: “socioeconomic categories—whether
based on education, employment, occupational social class or housing tenure—may
have neither the same nor consistent meanings in different ethnic groups.” Moreover,
especially in relation to implications for action, different kinds of heterogeneity can be
distinguished, ranging from a "cabinet of curiosities" to “participatory restructuring
through multiple points of engagement” (Taylor 2011). Discussion of different senses of
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heterogeneity would require a separate article, but the issue of meaning is picked up in
the final angle to follow, which brings this article to a close on a speculative note.
7.4 Attention to the meaning of life events and other factors can allow for
heterogeneous events to be subsumed under single factors. However, given the laborintensive nature of research into meaning, epidemiologists may need the subjects to
show how they connect knowledge with action to change their lives and communities in
response to ongoing social changes in specific situations.
A line of research initiated by the sociologists Brown and Harris in the late 1960s
has investigated how severe events and difficulties during people's life course influence
the onset of mental and physical illnesses Harris (2000). Brown and Harris use wideranging interviews, ratings of transcripts for the significance of past events in their
context (with the rating done blind, that is, without knowledge of whether the person
became ill), and statistical analyses. Because what might be recorded as the same
event, e.g., death of a spouse, might have very different meanings and significance for
different subjects according to the context, Brown and Harris’s methods accommodate
events with diverse meanings. At the same time, apparently heterogeneous events can
be subsumed under one factor, such as, in explanation of depression, a severe,
adverse event in the year prior to onset. In sum, their Life Events and Difficulties
methodology integrates “the quantitative analyses of epidemiology and the [in] depth
understanding of the case history approach” (Brown and Harris 1989, x).
The methodology of Brown and Harris is labor intensive; many who have been
trained in it have tried to streamline the case-history component and eventually shifted
to different lines of research. Suppose, however, that researchers took as starting
points the labor intensity of methodology that exposes diversity of meanings and the
possibility of underlying heterogeneity. One way forward might be to allow the subjects
in specific situations that continue to change to show how they connect knowledge with
action. That is, researchers could depart from the traditional emphasis on exposures
impinging on subjects and, instead, observe communities where people are resilient
and reorganize their health, lives and communities in response to social changes
(Sampson et al. 1997). Although the patterns and variation among people exposed by
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those studies might not extrapolate readily over time, place, and scale, they could
provide a point of departure for research and policy engagements in subsequent
situations the researchers study.
Such agent-oriented epidemiologists would need to be conversant with studies of
resilience and reorganization in communities. They would need to train in participant
observation and qualitative methods for research on population health changes that
arise through grassroots and professional initiatives and then grow into loosely knit
social movements, e.g., around innovations in short-term therapy for depression (e.g.,
Griffin and Tyrrell 2007, White 2007). In return, they—or anyone following the other
three conceptual themes in this section—need not accept Davey Smith’s conclusion
that considerable randomness at the individual level requires epidemiologists to focus
on modifiable causes of disease at the population level. There are pathways to explore
that take us beyond the gloomy prospect of epidemiology limited in its power to
generate reliable and useful associations of multiple factors with a disease.
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Appendix A
Getting beyond the implausibility response
This article’s primary goal is to promote wider discussion of heterogeneity, in
various forms, among genetic and epidemiological researchers and philosophers of
science. Yet, to undercut the analogy invoked by Davey Smith I take a radical path,
explaining how the estimates made in human quantitative genetics are unreliable and
typical interpretations, including interpretation of non-shared environmental influences,
are unjustified. Some readers may deem it implausible, given decades of debate
among methodologically sophisticated scholars, that some fundamental problems in
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quantitative genetic estimation have been overlooked (Kendler 2005). With a view to
moving readers beyond the implausibility response, let me describe some of the
background that has allowed me to see the study of heredity and variation differently
from most researchers and philosophers of science who have addressed quantitative
genetics.
My initial research work in the mid-1970s involved the statistical analysis of large
plant breeding trials, in which many cultivated varieties would be tested in each of many
locations around the world. A first step in the analysis was to partition the variation in a
given trait, say, yield of wheat plants, into components related to the averages or means
of the varieties (across all locations), the means of the locations (across all varieties),
and so on (see Figure 1). (Indeed, agricultural breeding was where partitioning of
variation and measuring heritability originated.) The challenge for the plant breeders
with whom I worked was to go beyond the partitioning and hypothesize what it was
about any variety that led to its pattern of response across locations and what it was
about any location that led to the varieties’ responses in that location compared to
others. Knowing what aspects of, say, the pedigree of the variety or of the environment
conditions in the location could inform subsequent breeding or cultivation decisions.
Yet, hypothesis generation was not easy even though we had large and complete data
sets to work from. A lesson I took from that research was that the limits to
hypothesizing about genetic and environmental factors must be even greater when
researchers partition variation for human traits. In human studies any geneticallydefined type is, at best, replicated twice—as identical twins—and different genetic types
cannot be systematically raised across the same range of “locations”—families, socioeconomic conditions, and so on.
Fast forward to a decade ago: I was learning about three disparate areas of
quantitative research that attempt to make sense of the complexity of biological and
social factors that build on each other in the development of the given trait over the life
course (Taylor 2004). I was impressed by what had been accomplished, but had some
reservations about the models used in one of the areas, namely, Dickens and Flynn’s
(2001) attempt to resolve the IQ paradox, in which researchers find large generation-togeneration advances in IQ test scores even though the trait is held to have high
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heritability. I explained my reservations to Dickens, digested his responses, and
explained my reservations about his subsequent responses. In the course of this I
found myself digger deeper into the conceptual foundations of heritability estimation and
partitioning of variation. In order to present a picture that differed from what Dickens,
Flynn, and others accepted without second thought, I was explicating first principles, not
disputing specialized models or mathematics or pointing to new data. Making extensive
use of perspectives and examples from the earlier plant breeding research, my
exposition took a pedagogical, build-from-the-foundations style (Taylor 2006, 2007,
2010).
Meanwhile, my investigation continued of the other two areas—life events and
difficulties research (Brown and Harris 1989) and developmental origins of chronic
diseases (Barker 1998). Barker’s work led me to life-course epidemiology (Kuh and
Ben-Shlomo 2004), so I spent time with Ben-Shlomo and the active social epidemiology
research group at Bristol University. Davey Smith is a leading figure in that group and
co-edits the International Journal of Epidemiology based at Bristol. While visiting in
2007 I gave a talk on “new and old debates about genes and environment,” which
touched on some of the questions about heterogeneity raised in this article. Davey
Smith’s spoken response was along the lines of his subsequent “gloomy prospect”
article: epidemiologists have to accept considerable randomness at the individual level
and keep the focus on modifiable causes of disease at the population level. In his
ensuing article, Davey Smith links this perspective to claims from quantitative genetics,
thus providing me an opportunity to address social epidemiologists and human
quantitative geneticists at the same time as I responded to his account. In bringing my
interest in heterogeneity to the attention of those audiences, this article extends the firstprinciples emphasis of the other recent work and thereby speaks to philosophers of
science. My contribution to philosophy takes the form, however, of articulating
conceptual themes, not dissecting specific cases on empirical, analytical, bioethical or
policy grounds. The expository approach reflects the background, with its roots in plant
breeding trials, that I have sketched in this Appendix, as well as the idea that
contributing to the conceptual toolbox of readers will prepare them to make their own
contributions to wider discussion of heredity, variation, and heterogeneity.
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Appendix B
Table of objections to critiques of heritability studies and counter-responses
Response

Counter-Response

There are many definitions or formulas for

The justification for calling the other

heritability other than the ratio of the

definitions heritability is that they

variance among variety means (genotypic

approximate the original definition or the

values) to the variance of the trait across

predictions it provides of advance under

the whole data set.

selection.

In particular, narrow-sense heritability is

Narrow-sense heritability can only be

favored over the broad-sense heritability

defined when quantitative genetics employs

above.

models of hypothetical, idealized genes
with simple Mendelian inheritance and
direct contributions to the trait. However, a
gene-free analysis of trait variation must
also be possible (Taylor 2012).

Genotype-environment interaction

From Taylor (2012): “Often cited in this

variance (here: variety-location interaction

vein, Plomin et al. (1977) consider a proxy

variance) has been shown to be

for variety-location interaction, namely, the

negligible for humans.

interaction of some variable, e.g., average
educational attainment, averaged for
biological parents and for adoptive parents.
How well such proxy results reflect actual
variety-location interaction and the
generality of the low values found by
Plomin et al.” has not been established.

Gene-environment interaction is not

This use of the term interaction in this

assumed to be negligible—Indeed, there

response refers to the statistical interaction

is an institutionalized field of research on

between measured genetic factors and

the topic.

measured environmental factors. This is
conceptually and empirically distinct from
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variety-location (genotype-environment)
interaction that means that for the trait in
question the ranking of varieties varies
across locations.
The intraclass correlation formulas in

Structural Equation Modeling shares the

heritability studies have been superceded

features that render unreliable estimates

by calculations that use Structural

made using the formulas (see points #1-6

Equation Models.

under Unreliable estimates in section 6).

"Research into the genetics of complex

Classical quantitative genetics… remains

traits has moved from the estimation of

relevant in several ways, such as indicating

genetic variance in populations to the

that “the trait [is] a potentially worthwhile

detection and identification of variants

candidate for molecular research” to

that are associated with or directly cause

identify the specific genetic factors involved

variation” (Visscher, et al. 2007)

(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002, chap.
11) and, in turn, the difficulty of identifying
such genetic factors has led to concerns
about “missing heritability” (e.g., Manolio et
al. 2009). [Text adapted from Taylor (2012)]

It is past time to move beyond debates on

The problems summarized in this account

the existence of genetic influences.

are worth recognizing: they call most
estimates and interpretations from human
quantitative genetics into question; and the
possibility of underlying heterogeneity that
arises from the more critical account helps
in clarifying the challenging paths ahead.

“It is one thing to criticize the

“Human quantitative genetics could be

methodology of specific studies. It is quite

viewed, contra Kendler, as akin to

another to suggest… that we reject the

alchemy… a field of inquiry that provided

results of an entire field of scientific

observations, questions, tools, debates,

inquiry… It is highly unlikely that modern

careers, and institutions which modern

psychiatric genetics will be judged by

chemistry built on, but ultimately had to
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future historians of science to be in such

break away from to make further progress”

company [as astrology and alchemy].”

(Taylor 2010).

(Kendler 2005, 10)
Some assumption has to be made that

No assumption has to be made because, in

connects similarity in traits for relatives to

a gene-free analysis of trait variation,

the fraction shared by the relatives of all

empirical estimation of a parameter to take

the genes that vary in the population;

degree of relatedness into account is

Direct proportionality is as good as any

possible (Taylor 2012). In any case,

other assumption.

estimates should indicate the sensitivity to
any such assumption.

It is well known that high heritability does

It is not widely acknowledged that high

not show where to look for the variants.

heritability is not a good indicator of which
traits are worthwhile candidates for
molecular research.

Human quantitative genetics is subject to

A focus on these technical issues runs the

various well-recognized, albeit contested

risk of missing or even reinforcing the more

objections, for example, has zygosity of

fundamental problems raised in this

twins been correctly ascertained and

account.

representatively sampled?; is the
treatment or experience of the twins or
unrelated individuals within a location
unaffected by whether they are
monzygotic twins, dizygotic twins, or
unrelated? (Taylor 2012).
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